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ARTICLES
THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ON
BUSINESSES
by Prof. John Warren Kindt*
I. THE IMPACT OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ON THE
BUSINESS/ECONOMIC EVIRONMENT
Under good economic conditions, but particularly during recessionary
periods, there is usually intense competition between states to attract new
businesses. New businesses improve local and state economies by provid-
ing an influx of investment dollars, jobs, and new tax revenues. As states
and municipalities attempted to boost economic growth during the reces-
sionary U.S. economy of 1991-1992, the legalized gambling organizations
in Nevada and in Atlantic City, New Jersey, saw the perfect opportunity to
expand their organizations into previously unexploited regions.'
Notwithstanding contrary positions argued by legalized gambling in-
terests in their efforts to gain and exploit new population bases,2 and with
rare exceptions, legalized gambling activities do not generate long-term or
even mid-term strategic economic development or tax revenues.3 Any
profit generated by legalized gambling almost invariably comes from some
consumer's pre-existing funds, and the resources devoted to gambling are
taken from other activities.4 In fact, legalized gambling interests have both
promoted and discouraged legalized gambling when necessary to further
their objectives. In one instance, major legalized gambling organizations
* Professor, University of Illinois; A.B. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977, Uni-
versity of Georgia; LL.M. 1978, SJD, University of Virginia.
I See BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, STAFF WHITE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING IN CHI-
CAGO, apps. P, Q, & R (1992) [hereinafter BETTER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT]. Of course, the present
analysis deals exclusively with "legalized" or "legal" gambling activities and concomitant propositions,
and all references to "gambling" should be interpreted as discussing legal gambling and not illegal
gambling activities.
2 Id.
3 See generally ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING As A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 16-19, 51-56 (Ctr. for Economic Development, U. Mass.-Amherst 1994) [hereinafter
GOODMAN].
4 Id. at 51-56.
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
conducted public relations campaigns arguing that their casinos would
create economic development, jobs, and tax revenues in Illinois.' Howev-
er, in order to undercut their competition in California and preserve their
own gambling operations in Nevada, some of these same organizations
simultaneously conducted public relations campaigns in California arguing
just the opposite.6
Throughout the 1980s the legalized gambling organizations in Atlantic
City and Nevada, in particular, felt competitive pressure from the nation-
wide proliferation of state lotteries.7 For example, in 1986 the legalized
gambling interests in Nevada, and even Nevada state officials, opposed the
initiation of a state lottery in California.' If the Nevada legalized gam-
bling interests were concerned with the proximate competition of a Cali-
fornia state lottery, they were more concerned with the potential "devastat-
ing impact" of a 1992 proposal for a moderately-sized casino operation in
Adelanto, San Bernardino County, California.9 Not only would the
Adelanto casino "initiative" further saturate the legalized gambling market,
but more importantly, it would also intercept the local population traveling
from Southern California to Las Vegas ° and open the door to more di-
rect competition from casinos on Indian reservations throughout Califor-
nia.
The legalized gambling interests in Nevada were also concerned in
general with future market saturation within the state. From years of mar-
keting experience, the legalized gambling organizations were well aware
that legalized gambling draws dollars from nearby local and state econo-
mies." Therefore, the legalized gambling interests needed to expand their
marketing bases to continue to attract consumer dollars. If the expansion
process was forestalled for very long, the guaranteed population of legal-
5 BErrER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 1, at apps. P & Q.
Id. at app. R.
See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER AND PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE 41-48 (1989)
[hereinafter CLOrFELTER].
a Id. at 130.
9 BEw.R GOV'T AsS'N REPORT, supra note 1, at app. R.
10 See id.
" See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA
AND NEVADA: SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF LEGALIzED GAMBLING ES-I
(December 1992) ("Gambling by Californians pumps nearly $3.8 billion per year into Nevada, and
probably adds about $8.8 billion - and 196,000 jobs - to the Nevada economy, counting the second-
ary employment it generates .... This is a direct transfer of income and wealth from California to
Nevada each year.") [hereinafter SUBSIDY].
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ized gambling "consumers" (10 percent "problem economic gamblers,"' 2
which included 1.5 to 5 percent "compulsive gamblers"'3) would be ex-
hausted 4 and profits from those economies in which the legalized gam-
bling organizations were located would diminish or evaporate.'
While the proliferation of state lotteries during the 1980s6 jeopar-
dized the regular tourist base attracted by legalized gambling, the major
threat to the legalized gambling organizations was the long-term saturation
of the market itself. Yet even while the expansion of state lotteries threat-
ened the Nevada and Atlantic City legalized gambling interests, it also
unexpectedly provided those interests with their strategic solution. The
public's acceptance of state lotteries 7 had softened the image of legalized
gambling and was laying the groundwork for the national acceptance of
the "harder" forms of legalized gambling - that is, those forms with
more of a "thrill factor."' 8 This trend was further intensified by millions
of dollars in advertising by state lotteries 9 aimed at softening concerns
12 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 92-94 (approximately ten percent of the public gambles
sixty-five percent or more of the gambling dollar). From a business-economic perspective, "problem
economic gamblers" consist of gamblers who are in the process of becoming problem or probable
compulsive gamblers, or who are already compulsive gamblers.
13 Id. at 124-25. See also VALERIE C. LORENZ, AN OVERVIEW OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING
2-4 (booklet of the National Center for Pathological Gambling) (1990).
Sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists generally delimit "compulsive" or "pathological
gamblers" pursuant to the South Oaks Gambling Screen. See Henry R. Lesieur and Sheila B. Blume,
The South Oaks Gambling Screen: A New Instrument For The Identification Of Pathological Gam-
blers, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1184 (1987). From a business-economic perspective, "compulsive eco-
nomic gamblers" are synonymous with the sociological definition of compulsive or pathological gam-
blers.
1 See generally MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, ALCOHOL
AND DRUG ABUSE ADMINISTRATION, TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND
(Valerie C. Lorenz and Robert M. Politzer, co-chairs, 1990) [hereinafter MARYLAND REPORT].
is Indeed, Nevada and Atlantic City thrived thanks to the massive numbers of tourists attract-
ed to these gambling meccas which exercised a practical monopoly on the more thrilling, or "harder,"
forms of legalized gambling in the United States.
1 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 144-51.
17 See, e.g., id. at 151-58. Of course, the lottery issue was often the subject of rigorous public
debate in many states. Id
Is For a discussion of this "thrill factor" or "sensation seeking in gamblers" and a review of
the relevant literature, see Kenny Coventry and R. lain Brown, Sensation Seeking In Gamblers And
Non-Gamblers And Its Relation To Preference For Gambling Activities, Chasing Arousal And Loss Of
Control In Regular Gamblers, in GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM GAMBLING 25 (1993).
19 Approximately 3.2 to 3.6 cents of each dollar spent on state lotteries is utilized for prizes,
advertising and promotional activities. CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 26-27, 199-202. More advertising
expenses are spent in the lottery industry (2 to 2.2 percent) than in any other industry except amuse-
ment and recreation (3 percent). Id. at 200. Lottery states spend approximately $300 million per year
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about legalized gambling activities and promulgating the widespread ac-
ceptance of games of chance.
Illinois serves as an example of an early state to develop legalized
gambling activities. In Illinois, the state lottery was initiated in 1974; 0 a
variety of lottery "games" proliferated throughout the 1980s; major ex-
pansions in the numbers of off-track betting parlors occurred in 1990 and
1991;22 riverboat gambling was legalized in 1990 and initiated in
1991;23 video-machine gambling was also proposed in 1991-1992;24 and
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley proposed a $2 billion land-based casino
complex in 1992." Furthermore, by 1992 over 50 bills regarding legal-
ized gambling activities were pending in the Illinois state legislature.26
South Dakota serves as an example of an even more rapidly-develop-
ing gambling state. Until the initiation of its state lottery in 1987, there
was no legalized gambling per se in South Dakota. However, beginning
November 1, 1989, the city of Deadwood, South Dakota, initiated land-
based casino gambling after a state-wide plebiscite; casino gambling on
the Indian reservations was in full operation by 1990; and by 1991, video-
machine gambling was available throughout the state.2"
on advertising. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 14.
2 CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 5.
21 Id. at 6.
n See ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, WAGERING IN ILLINOIS 26-28 (1992).
Id. at 51-53 (Act approved February 7, 1990; operations began September 8, 1991, in
Alton, Ill.).
24 Illinois State Representative E. J. Giorgi repeatedly supported video-slots/video-machine
gambling during 1991-1992. See, e.g., Chuck Sweeny, Giorgi, Bishop Clash Over Gambling, REGIS-
TER STAR (Rockford, 11.), December 12, 1991, at 1.
25 Edward Walsh, Chicago May Gamble On Casino Proposal, WASH. POST, May 24, 1992,
§ A, at 3 [hereinafter Walsh].
2 For an example of how the process of legalizing gambling gains a momentum of its own,
see Jack R. Van Der Slik, Legalized Gambling: Predatory Policy, ILL. ISSUFS, March 1990, at 30.
2 CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 146. The state lottery was approved in 1986 and began oper-
ating in 1987.
2 Legalized video-machine gambling had begun on October 1, 1989. A vote to repeal the vid-
eo-machine gambling was defeated by 62.8 percent to 37.2 percent on November 3, 1992. 1. Nelson
Rose, Gambling And The Law: 1992 Elections, Endless Field Of Dreams 1 (1992) (unpublished arti-
cle, on file with author).
A massive public relations campaign by the legalized gambling interests misdirected the voters
into believing that repealing video-machine gambling would reduce the number of tax dollars going to
education. For examples of how the public has been misled by arguments that legalized gambling will
assist education, see BETrrM GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 1, at app. Q; CLOTFELTER, supra
note 7, at 151-53. See also Daley Seeks Teachers' Support For Casino, NEWS-GAZETrE (Champaign,
Ill.), March 29, 1992, § B, at 8 (Mayor Daley of Chicago seeking the support of the Illinois Federation
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Within two years of initiating these casinos and state-wide video lot-
tery terminals (VLTs), an interesting business phenomenon was observed
in South Dakota: a number of personal and business bankruptcies were
being caused by gambling debts.29
"There'd be significantly fewer bankruptcies without the gam-
bling aspects," said Peder Ecker, a federal bankruptcy judge in
Sioux Falls. "There's definitely a pattern of increasing bankruptcy
filings because of the gambling."
Ecker said he attributed most of the bankruptcies related to
gambling to the state's video lottery, saying he saw no cases that
involved gambling debts before the game started in October 1989.
Gambling has grown to rival uninsured medical costs as a leading
cause of bankruptcies, he said.3"
These bankruptcies and the concomitant losses in jobs were a direct result
of legalized gambling, and would not have occurred had VLT gambling,
casino gambling, and even the "softer" gambling of the state lottery not
been legalized.3
Clinical observations appear to confirm this phenomenon. The law
firm handling most of the bankruptcy cases in South Dakota confirmed
that while the overall number of filings were down, gambling was an in-
creasing cause of bankruptcies in South Dakota.32 Similarly, a 1992 Min-
of Teachers for a casino complex in Chicago).
29 See, e.g., Todd Nelson, S.D. Bankruptcies Down 5 Percent, Judge: Gambling Caused Most
Cases, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), January 15, 1993, at I [hereinafter S.D. Bankruptcies]. Not
surprisingly, this phenomenon had been predicted. See, e.g., JoDean Joy, Address before the South
Dakota Citizens Forum on Video-Lottery Terminals, Sioux Falls, S.D. (October 18, 1992) (a national-
ly-recognized critic of legalized gambling activities).
S.D. Bankruptcies, supra note 29, at I (emphasis added).
31 It should be noted that the legalization of gambling activities increases the number of com-
pulsive gamblers from .77 percent of the population to 1.5 to 5 percent. See notes 12-14, supra, and
accompanying text.
32 S.D. Bankruptcies, supra note 29, at 1. According to one bankruptcy attorney, this phenom-
enon was puzzling:
"I can't put my finger on why there were fewer filings," Blake said.
"I consulted with a lot of people about bankruptcy that apparently didn't follow
through .... It always mystified me when somebody comes in with $40,000 of debt and
you don't see them again."
Blake agreed that gambling is an increasing cause of bankruptcy.
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nesota report also raised the proposition that increased legalized gambling
activities in the state might be linked to the increase in bankruptcies.3
In any event, South Dakota and Illinois illustrate that with enough
public relations dollars promoting legalized gambling activities,' both
public officials and voters could be directed toward accepting the argu-
ments that legalized gambling activities are traditional "businesses,"35 and
would provide net jobs and positive tax revenues on a statewide basis.'
If these arguments were palatable to the U.S. public during a healthy eco-
nomic climate, then these arguments would be even more acceptable and
gain impetus during recessionary times.37 That 1992 in particular was a
time to capitalize on the economic fears of the public was reinforced by
Bill Clinton's victory over President George Bush - when mounting con-
cern over the U.S. economy was identified as the primary voter issue.3"
The window of opportunity had opened for the legalized gambling organi-
"I see people every month who tell me that it was because of video lottery," he said.
"I see cases where people essentially gamble away $40,000 or $50,000 over a couple of
years. Sometimes it's $5,000 to $10,000."
Id.
It has been estimated that most compulsive gamblers tend to admit only approximately one-third
of their actual debt due to gambling. Letter from Ms. Elizabeth George, Executive Director, Minnesota
Council on Compulsive Gambling (December 21, 1992) (on file with author). In addition, the national
statistics indicate the average debt of the "bottomed-out" compulsive gambler is conservatively esti-
mated between $75,000 and $80,000. MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 14, at 60-61.
33 MINNESOTA PLANNING OFFICE, HIGH STAKES: GAMBLING IN MINNESOTA 29 (1992).
Sponsors spent $5 million to promote a $2 billion proposal for a casino complex in Chica-
go. Patrick T. Reardon and Rick Pearson, Casino Firms Say Patience Tapped Out, Ca. TRIB., Decem-
ber 4, 1992, § 2, at 1, 7.
35 See, e.g., ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT AND WAGERING STUDY 1991 10-11
(1992). This governmental study basically accepts in toto the arguments of the riverboat interests and
ignores the overall welfare of the Illinois public. Id. at 9-11. See BETTER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra
note 1. app. Q, at 23-25 (internal public relations report "leaked" to the public, delimiting "'The Mob'
As Businessmen").
36 See generally, BETTER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 1, app. Q; GOODMAN, supra
note 3.
3 Experts say the current recession causes people to gamble more, not less. As the economy
sours, studies show, people look for quick solutions to their woes - especially the poor, who are
hardest hit in bad times.
"When economic times turn down, there will always be a segment of society that tends to
try to hit a big score because the legitimate means for upward mobility have been reduced,"
says H. Roy Kaplan, sociologist and author of the 1978 book "Lottery Winners."
Susan M. Barbieri, 'The Addiction Of The '90s': Compulsive Gambling Comes Into Its Own In Reces-
sionary Times, WASH. POST, November 30, 1992, § D, at 5.
39 See, e.g., Howard Fineman, The Torch Passes, NEWSWEEK, November/ December 1992,
at 4, 6.
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zations, and the time had come for them to initiate a strategy of carpe di-
em and expand beyond Nevada and Atlantic City."' However, even a
New Jersey Commission generally favorable to legalized gambling activ-
ities cautioned that "New Jersey should never risk weakening its regulato-
ry systems to enhance the State's fiscal condition or offset possible eco-
nomic consequences occasioned by downturns ... ."' Furthermore, the
Commission noted it was "clear that retail business and retail employment
in Atlantic City have continued to decline despite the presence 'of gam-
bling ... ."' The economic caveat is that state governments should not
be prodded by perceived economic vulnerability into hasty and risky de-
velopmental policies - such as legalized gambling - which might even-
tually intensify business-economic problems. 2
Notwithstanding the generally poor economic conditions of 1991-
1992, the timing for the legalized gambling organizations was propitious,
and their strategy was simple: instead of waiting for tourists to come to
them, the organizations would go to the tourists by locating in as many
dense population centers as possible.43 Those establishments successfully
implementing this strategy would not have to worry about profitability for
years since the legalized gambling activities would naturally take a major
portion of the sixty-five percent "market cream" of the local population's
gambling dollars." This phenomenon means that there is a premium for
being the first, most aggressive, or "most thrilling" form of legalized gam-
bling established in a population center. Hence, it was not surprising that
there were proposals during 1992 for major land-based casinos in Chicago
and New Orleans - both prime population centers.
3 For specialized discussions of the evolution of legalized gambling activities in Atlantic
City, New Jersey, see GEORGE STERNLIEB AND JAMES W. HUGHES, THE ATLANTIC CITY GAMBLE
(1983); Hawkins, The Atlantic City Experience: Casino Gambling As An Economic Recovery Program,
6 SETON HALL LEGiS. J. 85 (1982); KIMBERLY J. WARKER, CASINO GAMBLING As URBAN REDEVEL-
OPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY (1988).
40 NEW JERSEY GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON GAMBLING, REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 5 (1988) (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 16.
42 GOODMAN, supra note 3. at 16.
43 See, e.g., BETTER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 1, apps. P, Q, & R (internal "leaked"
planning documents of the legalized gambling industry).
" See notes 12-14, supra, and accompanying text. As one business source reported:
"It will be impossible not to make a lot of money," one executive in New Orleans bragged
before his casino had even opened. "It's like spitting and missing the floor."
James Popkin and Katia Hetter, America's Gambling Craze, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 14,
1994, at 42, 43.
45 See id. The efforts in New Orleans were substantially successful. In the form of a "compro-
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Once proposed gambling activities become legalized, the legalized
gambling interests are concerned primarily with the quickest and most
effective way to tap the local economy.' The fastest drain seems to be
approximately three to five years before the 1.5 to 5 percent of local com-
pulsive gamblers will "bottom-out," spending and losing their total as-
set/credit base. Therefore, while tourist campaigns and advertisements may
be undertaken, legalized gambling organizations would almost invariably
profit even if they did not attract a single tourist for approximately
five years.47
Given the inherent nature of the legalized gambling markets, the first
five years of business generally constitute the major revenue years for
most legalized gambling organizations - after which they must find new
markets and/or new marketing gimmicks to attract gamblers.48 During the
first five years, the profit margins can be surprisingly large. For example,
in 1990 the Excalibur in Las Vegas opened as the largest hotel in the
United States and then stunned the business world by paying its entire
mortgage out of "operating revenues" in less than 2 years - while the
rest of the country was in a recession.49 In another scenario, the gambling
riverboat in Alton, Illinois, sold more than $100 million in stock during its
first day of trading. 0
mise," Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards signed a bill on June 18, 1992, authorizing but a single
casino, although the legislation left open the possibility of future additional casinos. Rita Koselka,
Fantasyland, FORBES, March 1, 1993, at 62 [hereinafter Koselka].
The estimated increased costs of this casino to the New Orleans criminal justice system were es-
timated at $10.4 million per year for police and corrections costs, $2.3 million per year for attorney's
fees, and $1.5 million for court costs. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION,
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, How CASINO GAMBLING AFFECTS LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 (April 16, 1992)
[hereinafter ILL. STATE POLICE]; Terrance W. Gainor, Director of the Illinois State Police, Address
before Annual IAODAPCA Luncheon, May 8, 1992, at 9-10 (transcript on file with author).
46 In Louisiana's case, this concern may have been reflected in the initial approval of but a
single casino for New Orleans, because the population base could have sustained more than one.
47 The pre-existing consumer base provides substantial dollars to legalized gambling activities
upon their initiation - regardless of any inputs by tourists. See, e.g., GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 51-
56.
This factor also explains why gambling organizations are adamant about seeking and get-
ting five-year tax waivers for the first five years of operation. See, e.g., Melissa Merlie, Betting Parlor
Operator Ties Danville Location To Tax Rebate, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), August 2, 1990,
§ A, at 1, 10.
4 James Coates, Vegas' Tip To Chicago: Casino Is Family Fun, CHI. Tim., April 10, 1992,
at 1, 10.
50 Ray Long, $100 Million In Riverboat Stock Sold, CHI. SUN-TIMES, February 19, 1993,
at 13. Critics wondered about megaprofits for investors, considering that much of the riverboat stock
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In any event, legalized gambling organizations cannot be characterized
as conventional businesses and do not conduct traditional business activi-
ties despite efforts to market themselves as such." Unless massive num-
bers of new tourists are attracted by the advent of legalized gambling ac-
tivities, the pre-existing economy and tourist trade are eventually depleted,
and consequently the legalized gambling will not provide state-wide eco-
nomic growth, jobs, or tax revenues.52 Legalized gambling interests in-
stead provide only the illusion of relative economic development, for
where one locale might gain, others surely lose. 3 Across the region as a
whole, there is no gain, but there can be large losses when the increased
regulatory costs, crime costs, and social-welfare costs are factored into the
analysis.' Economically speaking, legalized gambling is a sucker bet.
Like the fairy-tale, the economic Emperor of legalized gambling is wear-
ing no clothes. It is a sad reflection upon society, and particularly legisla-
tive officials, that so many have ignored the business-economic negatives
for so long.
II. LEGALIZED GAMBLING AND THE SHORT-TERM
ILLUSION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Any large infusion of money into a local economy can initially stimu-
late short-term economic development, new jobs, and tax revenues. How-
ever, short-term progress does not always indicate long-term growth. For
this reason it is essential to analyze legalized gambling and its projected
economic impact for the intermediate-term and long-term. Only then can
the actual economic effects of legalized gambling be adequately evaluated.
The legalized gambling interests, however, often focus public attention
on possible short-term economic benefits as a technique to misdirect the
was allegedly purchased for approximately one cent per share by the initial investors and that within
two years the stock was being sold at between $19.25 and $21.50 per share. No illegality, however,
was alleged. Floyd Norris, Insiders' Didn't Take Much Of A Gamble With Argosy Gaming,
N.Y. TIMES, February 25, 1993, § D, at 10.
51 Alf Siewers, 2 Reports Reveal Casino Strategy, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, August 7, 1992, at 14. See
also BErER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 1, apps. P, Q, & R (internal public relations documents
"leaked" from the offices of legalized gambling interests).
32 For a specific example of the importance of the tourist factor, see BETTrER Gov'T ASS'N
REPORT, supra note 1, at 46-48.
53 See GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 51-56.
34 See ILL. STATE POLICE, supra note 45, at 9.
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economic debate." What they conveniently omit is that the eventual re-
suits of legalized gambling are seriously debilitating. According to the
authoritative nationwide statistics,56 legalized gambling activities eventu-
ally effectuate:
1. economic dysfunction,"
2. the exploitation of minorities 8 and low-income groups,59
3. social dysfunction,'" and
4. an eventual increase in taxes to address new social problems
necessarily generated by legalized gambling.6
All forms of legalized gambling have a disproportionate impact on His-
panics" and Afro-Americans,63 as well as on low-income groups,'
who spend an average of 2.2 percent of their weekly income on legalized
gambling.65 These trends result in dramatic increased costs to social pro-
grams, increased unemployment for minorities, and more proportional
unemployment for minorities than for whites.'
Since legalized gambling leaves the local community and state with
increased social-welfare costs, inordinate pressures are placed on govern-
ment officials to raise real estate taxes, state income taxes, and business
55 For a review of fourteen studies analyzing the costs and benefits of various legalized gam-
bling proposals, see GOODMAN, supra note 3. Only one of these studies was considered "balanced,"
and most were criticized for "hiding the costs." Id. at 16.
5M See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 96-104.
7 Id. at99.
S8 Id. at 96, 98-100.
S9 Id. at 96-98. See also 138 CONG. REc. S187 (daily ed. January 22, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Simon) ("If you go into the poorest section of Chicago or East St. Louis, you will see people lined up
to buy lottery tickets .... [We have to find way[s] of raising revenue that do not impose on the
weakest and poorest in our society." (emphasis added)).
60 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 104-06.
61 Id. at 99, 132-35.
62 Id. at96.
63 Id. at 98.
64 Id. at 98-100. "[T]he prospect of households earning less than $10,000 per year averaging
$550 per year on gambling, for example, as studies have shown for lotteries, is sickening to contem-
plate." Earl L. Grinols, Analysis Of The Major Impacts Of Off-Track Gambling In Champaign, Illinois
(September 23, 1991) (unpublished report, on file with author), citing CLOTFELTER, supra note 7,
at 99.
65 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 99-100.
66 See, e.g., BEtTER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-68. See also id. at 56-69,
app. M.
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taxes.67 The promises of sustained economic growth promulgated by the
legalized gambling organizations constitute, at best, illusory promises. As
a result, the public contract between the legalized gambling organizations
and the state to assist the economy constitutes a nudum pactum, or void
agreement.
III. THE EFFORTS OF COMMUNITIES TO ATTRACT NEW
BUSINESSES
Businesses seek to locate in those local and state economies which
have or can provide a stimulating business/economic environment.' Eco-
nomically depressed areas often look beyond traditional manufacturing
jobs to bolster their economies, and legalized gambling activities may be
considered." However, an actual accounting of the societal cost-benefit
analysis is necessary to determine whether the activity, such as legalized
gambling, would produce the desired economic growth and should there-
fore be introduced into the region.70 The results of some economic stud-
ies" should "give pause to policymakers who are considering the use of
casinos as a machine for growth in depressed regions."72
"Stability of expectations"" is an essential ingredient of an attractive
business environment. Businesses need to know that if they perform in a
certain manner, they can minimize risk and maximize their expectations.
While risk is always a factor in a changing business environment, the in-
ability to calculate that risk is almost more destabilizing than the magni-
tude of any calculated risk.
One basic example of stability of expectations involves what is termed
"the maintenance of a favorable legal order." On a national level, busi-
67 See generally Andrew J. Buck et al., Casinos, Crime, And Real Estate Values: Do They
Relate?. 28 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 288, 301-02 (1991) [hereinafter Buck et al.];
Simon Hakim and Andrew J. Buck, Do Casinos Enhance Crime?, 17 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 409, 414-15
(1989) [hereinafter Hakim].
68 See Buck et al., supra note 67, at 301-02; Hakim, supra note 67, at 414-15.
69 Buck et al., supra note 67, at 289.
70 ld
71 See, e.g., GOODMAN, supra note 3, and infra.
n Buck et al., supra note 67, at 302.
73 For explanations of this concept in the context of the McDougal/Lasswell decision-making
model as applied to corporate development of national and international resources, see
JOHN W. KNDT, I MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 11-17 (1992); John W. Kindt,
Prolegomenon To Marine Pollution And The Law Of The Sea, 1I ENVTL. L. 67, 70-72 (1980).
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nesses want to know the "rules" under which they must operate. Commer-
cial entities understandably become concerned in a society or country
where, for example, the tax code is constantly changing, is not inherently
"uniform," and/or is not being uniformly applied (or is even manipulated
by the government).74 Further, and as an extreme example, companies
generally refuse to locate in countries undergoing revolution, or even
threatened revolution. Regardless of any overwhelmingly positive conces-
sions a pre-existing government may make, without stability of expecta-
tions businesses fear that those concessions will never be realized. Accord-
ingly, a lack of stability of expectations can hamper or destroy any given
business/economic environment by making calculation of risk difficult or
impossible.
Throughout the twentieth century, and particularly since World War II,
the maintenance of a favorable legal order and inherent stability have been
two major strengths of the United States which have induced foreign in-
vestment within the U.S. economy. Presumably, the United States enjoys a
higher stability of expectations than any other country, and this stability is
crucial to maintain this pillar of the U.S. business/economic environment.
One of the unfortunate results of the U.S. savings-and-loan debacle of the
1980s was to chip this economic pillar, particularly in the minds of many
U.S. citizens.75
Nationwide, the individual states have obviously benefited from these
overall U.S. economic strengths and have successfully solicited foreign
and domestic businesses to locate within their borders. Some states, how-
ever, have hurt their initially competitive positions for attracting new busi-
nesses by creating certain unstable business/economic factors. During
1991, for example, the states of California76 and Illinois' were unable to
pay their state obligations (such as wages to state employees in Illinois)
and engaged in delays and sleight-of-hand to pay their bills. In so doing,
these state governments effectively undermined the stability of expecta-
tions in their states,78 decreasing the likelihood that businesses would
74 See, e.g., John W. Kindt, The New Assault On Freedom Of Thought: Section 263A Of The
Internal Revenue Code, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 137 (1988).
75 See, e.g., Tom Schlesinger, A Taxpayers' Program For Cleaning Up The S&L Mess,
USA TODAY, September 1991, at 22.
76 Steven V. Roberts et al., California Crumbling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., September 14,
1992, at 69. See also Michael Meyer, In A State Of Collapse, NEWSWEEK, August 17, 1992, at 37.
n See Mary A. Laschober, The Link Between Current Tax Receipts And The Illinois Budget
Crisis, ILL. Bus. REv., Fall 1991, at 8, 9.
n See, e.g., H. Campbell Stuckeman, Community Evaluation In Site Selection, in INDUSTRIAL
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choose them as locations for new subsidiaries.79 Conversely, the bulk of
states which did not have to delay payments enjoyed a relative advantage
for attracting new businesses.' However, any concessions, such as tax
concessions, offered by California or Illinois could more than offset the
problem of "instability" of payments and thereby attract new businesses.
Yet despite the potential concessions California and Illinois may make to
new industries, they still suffer a competitive disadvantage due the inci-
dence of past instability. In essence, California and Illinois must now
"pay" for the previous unstable business/economic conditions caused by
their legislative budgeting anomalies.
IV. BUSINESS LOCATION MODELS
In determining where to invest their dollars by building new plants or
establishing new subsidiaries, corporations with large asset bases generally
turn to "business location models."'" Even small companies can utilize
the less complex models, 2 but the models utilized by the larger compa-
nies, 3 such as the Fortune 500,' tend to be quite sophisticated. 5 Obvi-
ously, the major businesses like to keep these models confidential,s be-
FAcILmEs PLANNING 97, 99 (H. M. Conway and Linda L. Liston eds., 1976) [hereinafter Stuckeman].
79 See notes 100-105, infra, and accompanying text.
so Stuckeman, supra note 78, at 99 (the "state business climate"). "Are the state legislative,
executive and judiciary branches performing as well as other state governments?" Id. This category
constitutes one of the criteria in the site selection process for businesses.
81 For historical background and an introduction to business-related decision-making in gener-
al. see FRIEDRICH ROSENKRANZ, AN INTRODUCTION To CORPORATE MODELING (1979) [hereinafter
ROSENKRANZ]. See generally, JON E. BROWNING, How To SELECT A BUSINESS SITE (1980) [hereinaf-
ter BROWNING]; INDUSTRIAL FACULrrEs PLANNING (H. M. Conway and Linda L. Liston eds., 1976)
(hereinafter PLANNING]; WILLIAM N. KINNARD AND STEPHEN D. MESSNER, EFFECTIVE BUSINESS
RELOCATION (1970) [hereinafter KINNARD]; ROGER W. SCHMENNER, MAKING BUSINESS LOCATION
DECISIONS (1982) [hereinafter SCHMENNER]; DAVID M. SMITH, INDUSTRIAL LOCATION (2d ed. 1981)
[hereinafter SMITH]; JOHN S. THOMPSON, SITE SELECTION (1982) [hereinafter THOMPSON]; ALFRED
WEBER, THEORY OF THE LOCATION OF INDUSTRIES (Carl J. Friedrich trans., 1937) [hereinafter WE-
BER].
82 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 81, at 167 (store location research for single stores); id.
at 197 (simplified guide to store location research).
83 For examples of the starting points for the business location models including the variable-
cost model and operational models, see generally SMITH, supra note 81, at 149-313.
" For general examples of business location analyses involving the Fortune 500, see
SCHMENNER, supra note 81, at 60 et seq.
95 For a summary of various theories of business location within the framework of spatial eco-
nomic analysis, see SMITH, supra note 81, at 68-107. See also WEBER, supra note 81.
96 Businesses express a need for confidentiality in various aspects of the decision-making pro-
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cause the models can be the subject of large investments of time and
money, and because competitors would gain some economic advantage
from them. A classic example of a company utilizing sophisticated busi-
ness location models involves a major fast food chain, which is the leader
in its area. Its competitors would obviously be quite interested in being
able to predict ahead of time where and when that chain was going to
establish new outlets and potentially locate there first.
One nuance strategy for the smaller competitors in such a market situ-
ation is simply to let the industry leader claim the primary location sites
and then to follow the leader to those sites when they become public. This
location strategy bypasses many of the expenses in utilizing business loca-
tion models, but the escalating real estate costs which must be internalized
by being the second, third, or fourth competitor into a prime market area
may often be greater than the costs of utilizing the business location mod-
els. However, from an individual state's perspective, familiarity with busi-
ness location models will likely expand that state's opportunity for attract-
ing new businesses and even for retaining established businesses.87
When faced with the decision-making process of where to locate ini-
tially or where to expand its presence, a company should examine the tra-
ditional business location models.8 Some business models are used more
than others, but many of the factors utilized therein are quite consistent
with the economic variations that depend on the nature of the business. 9
Over time, the models often become quite sophisticated' as they adapt to
the specialized needs of the company which makes use of them. It should
also be noted that given their complexities, these models can easily take
on "minds of their own" and the number of variables these models address
can yield unexpected conclusions.9
cess involving businesses location issues. For example, a company may "send several teams at differ-
ent times to anonymously inspect each community." Stuckeman, supra note 79, at 97.
97 For examples of business location information of interest to state policymakers, see
KINNARD, supra note 81, at 32-34 (public awareness and involvement); SMrrIT, supra note 81, at 63
(public policy, planning, and the state) and 359-92 (industrial location, development planning, and so-
cial well-being). See generally BROWNING, supra note 8 1, at 31-48.
a For examples of starting points for formulating business location models, see note 81, su-
pra, and accompanying text.
89 See generally id.
90 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 81, at 149 et seq.
91 For an introduction to the historical business decision-making models in general and their
complexities, see ROSENKRANZ, supra note 81. For a historical perspective on planning systems in the
context of business decision-making, see JAMES B. BOULDEN, COMPUTER-ASSISTED PLANNING SYS-
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Most of the traditional business location models include a category
which is generically termed the "business environment."' A classic "red-
flag" component of this category is "high-crime rate."'93 For example, a
business location computer model would, by definition, identify a generic
type of red-flag to alert a company which was considering locating in a
particular county if that county had the highest violent crime rate or the
highest illegal drug use in the state.' Similarly, "legalized gambling ac-
tivities" become an important factor in a company's decision whether to
locate in certain communities.' While the advantages of locating in a
given area might still overwhelm the notable disadvantages associated with
its red-flag drawbacks,' that decision would have to be made as a type
of managerial override of the red-flag alerts.' The point is that counties
TEMS (1975).
Perhaps "the most important qualification of all" is "community attitude" as part of the
business environment. Stuckeman, supra note 78, at 99. "Community" and "Government Aspects"
constitute "Major Factors That Shape Plant Location Searches." SCHmENNER, supra note 81, at 33. For
examples of checklists involving the community business climate, see BROWNING, supra note 81, at
108-11, 125-28. The origins of this consideration are apparently found in "social and cultural" location
dynamics. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 81, at 21-22. In current analyses, businesses are often encour-
aged to "hand-pick" their business community environments. See, e.g., BROWNING, supra note 81, at
87-114. In a juxtaposition of issues in this area, some traditional business ventures, such as retail li-
quor stores, carry the image of imposing various sorts of "negative environmental impacts" on the
community and these businesses must accommodate community concerns before entering a chosen
community. See, e.g., KINNARD, supra note 81, at 60-62.
93 See, e.g., BROWNING, supra note 81, at 164 (checklist of "Police Aspects"); PLANNING,
supra note 81, at 303-04 (civil disorders), 308 (crime); Stuckeman, supra note 78, at 99. For examples
of analyses demonstrating the interface between crime and some business-economic issues in the area
of legalized gambling, see Buck et al., supra note 67, at 288; Hakim, supra note 67, at 409. Various
impacts are incorporated under the general rubric of "crime."
94 For an example of a practical application of crime (specifically, robbery) as factored into
"quality of life" considerations in business location decisions, see John M. Griffin and Norbert Dee,
Measuring The Intangible: How To Quantify Quality Of Life, in PLANNING, supra note 81, at 219,
220-21.
For examples of various "pitfalls" to be considered in business location models, see
BROWNING, supra note 81, at 205-211.
Id. Historical trends provide support for these propositions.
During the first six years of the 1970s, seventy-three (almost 15 percent) of the Fortune-500
companies moved their headquarters. The most frequent reason stated was the decline of
the cities. High crime rates, dirty streets, and the fact that increasing numbers of young ex-
ecutives offered a job at headquarters refused it have also contributed.
Id. at 10. Business location models delimit a "[p]rimary concern for the quality of life in an area."
SCHMENNER, supra note 81, at 38 (emphasis in original).
97 The final question for the business location decision maker is often: "If the company trans-
ferred me to this location, would I want to move my family here?" BROWNING, supra note 81, at 210.
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and states with these red-flag components are at a definite competitive
disadvantage for attracting new businesses to their economies.
The question of whether high crime rates per se are associated with
legalized gambling activities is beyond the scope of this discussion.98 In
addition, any specific red-flag areas are or should be separate components
in business location models. Even so, pre-existing legalized gambling
activities in any county or state constitute a definite negative in efforts to
attract new businesses (and in keeping pre-existing businesses)." It is
largely irrelevant whether the gambling activity has been legalized or not.
The basic negative socio-economic impacts of an activity do not change
just because an activity has been "legalized" - although the parameters of
the negatives may be regulated or monitored more closely.
In the public domain, the best analysis interfacing a community envi-
ronment with readily accessible legalized gambling activities is contained
in The Impact of Casino Gambling In New Orleans"° by the Division of
Business and Economic Research at the University of New Orleans. This
report referenced a 1989 survey... in which business leaders were asked
what factors were "absolutely essential" in locating their businesses:0
With respect to office locations, the business leaders listed eight
factors that were important. Of these eight, two were related to the
business climate: 1) the climate created by state and local govern-
ment for business, which was ranked fourth with 29 percent of the
respondents saying it was essential and 2) the ability to attract
executives and professional[s] from outside the area, which was
9 See, e.g., Buck et al., supra note 67, at 288; Hakim, supra note 67, at 409.
For a summary of the socio-economic concerns associated with legalized gambling activities as
they interface with the criminal justice system, see Frank Kelley, Michigan Attorney General, Address
before the International Conference on Gambling, Nashville, Tenn. (February 11, 1994) ("I have been
Michigan's Attorney General for more than thirty years, and there has never been an issue that has
disturbed me any more than the proliferation of gambling in our state.") [hereinafter Mich. Att'y
Gen.].
As a general observation in a related issue area involving business location decisions,
"Imany business activities are regarded as 'unsuitable neighbors' both for residences and for other
types of more 'desirable' business activity." KINNARD, supra note 81, at 61.
IO TIMOTHY P. RYAN, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CASINO GAMBLING IN NEW ORLEANS (Divi-
sion of Business and Economic Research, University of New Orleans 1990) [hereinafter RYAN].
101 This survey was undertaken by the economic development finn of Cushman and Wakefield,
utilizing the polling firm of Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.
102 RYAN, supra note 100, at 30.
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ranked seventh with 22 percent of the respondents saying it was
essential. This is consistent with other surveys that have been
done."oa
It should also be noted that when these business leaders were polled about
"other" cities, "[olnly three percent felt that Las Vegas was an attractive
place to locate a business today [1989]' 4 and "only 2 percent respond-
ed that they felt Las Vegas would be attractive in the next five years. ' 'ItB
An actual case example demonstrated several of these points when in
March of 1992, Mayor Richard Daley announced and gave his support to
a proposed $2-billion casino complex for Chicago."° Mayor Daley's
plan was criticized as "increasing crime and other social problems and
discouraging other businesses from locating [in Chicago]."'" In this con-
text, Mayor Daley claimed that he had first tried to attract another Walt
Disney World to the Chicago area,l"B but failing in that attempt he was
hoping to establish a $2-billion casino complex. Despite the many vari-
ables associated with such decisions, the speed with which the Mayor
appeared to dismiss the Disney-type possibility hurt the Mayor's credibili-
ty. It seemed unreasonable that an attractive offer could not have been
negotiated to attract the Walt Disney Company or a similar company -
given the resources of the City of Chicago and the Governor of Illinois
(whom Mayor Richard Daley did not consult prior to announcing the
Chicago casino complex)."B
Even so, it seemed illogical that a theme park the size of Walt Disney
World would ever locate in the Chicago area once a $2-billion casino
complex was approved. In other words, in business as in politics, the rule
is that business persons should "never say never." However, in this hypo-
103 Id. at 30-31.
104 Id. at 32.
105 Id.
106 Walsh, supra note 25, at 3.
107 Id.
108 See generally, Chris Reidy, Gambling Has Become The Nice Vice, BOSTON GLOBE, Janu-
ary 17, 1993, at 69, 71 ("The word gambling makes ... [employees of legalized gambling organiza-
tions] uncomfortable .... In an era when casinos are designed with water slides and Disney-style
theme parks .... [they prefer] such terms as 'gaming' and 'family entertainment'.").
09 John Kass and Rick Pearson, Daley Folds Casino Hand, CHI. TRIB., January 8, 1993, § I,
at 1, 18. "[Mayor] Daley had sought the legislature's approval of the casino project last year without
first discussing the idea with [Governor] Edgar, who is opposed to casino gambling in the city." Id.
at 1.
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thetical instance, the business location models and/or decision-making pro-
cess for a Disney-size theme park would probably have "red-flags" all
over the "business environment" category, as well as many other catego-
ries. Of course this discussion is limited to only the impacts of legalized
gambling activities, while many other factors in the business location
models (such as the climate in Chicago) could have been of crucial impor-
tance.
In other hypothetical discussions, a related, interesting scenario could
also occur. After the Walt Disney Company publicly announced plans in
1993 to establish a theme park in the area of Manassas, Virginia, a pro-
posal for a legalized gambling riverboat complex was aggressively pro-
moted for Richmond, Virginia - only ninety-four miles away."0 Since
tourism is the second leading industry in Virginia, it is interesting to con-
sider whether a "pre-existing" legalized gambling complex in Richmond or
in Washington, D.C. (only thirty-seven miles distant from Manassas)
would have negated the decision of the Walt Disney Company. Perhaps
the projected drawdown on the visitors to the Disney theme park would
have been minimal given the distances involved. Perhaps other consider-
ations of locale would have been more important to Disney than the socio-
economic negatives associated with concentrated legalized gambling activ-
ities. Perhaps pre-existing legalized gambling complexes in Virginia would
have caused Disney to reconsider Chicago. Regardless of these consider-
ations and many other variables which may have been vital, the fact re-
mains that Disney chose to locate first in a state with little or no legalized
gambling activities."'
110 For an outline of the proposal to bring legalized riverboat gambling to Virginia, see Rob-
ert W. Cook, Economic And Fiscal Impact Of Riverboat Gaming In Virginia (November 1993) (pre-
pared for the Virginia Riverboat Council, calculating that seven riverboats would create $123 million
in tax revenues, 7,000 direct jobs, and 17,000 indirect jobs). For a critique of this report, see
Wayne K. Talley, An Analysis Of Economic And Fiscal Impact Of Riverboat Gaming In Virginia
(February 1994) (prepared for the Assembly Group, concluding that seven riverboats would create only
$10 million in tax revenues and 2,766 net jobs) (available from Prof. Wayne K. Talley, Old Dominion
University, Norfolk, Va.). The large differences in these numbers indicate the typical parameters of the
economic debate. Professor Talley's analysis was significantly more realistic and highlighted the prob-
lem of double counting which apparently occurred in the earlier analysis.
I In any event, Virginia had considerably less legalized gambling activities than Illinois,
which already had nine or ten riverboats, as well as off-track betting parlors in 1993. Virginia did,
however, have the lottery, which was initiated in 1988. CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 156-58 (refer-
endum passed November 4, 1987). Presumably, the initial business location investigation would have
begun years before Disney's public announcement in 1993.
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In this context, it is interesting to note that the 85-member Greater
Washington (D.C.) Board of Trade quickly and unanimously rejected a
1993 proposal to bring casino gambling to the area."' There was appar-
ently very little debate among businesses and the tourist trade in Washing-
ton, D.C. - compared with the debate in Chicago which began in 1992
and continued into 1994. The press report on the decision of the business
leaders in the Washington, D.C. area was revealing.
The Washington area's most influential business group... de-
nounced Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly's efforts to bring casino gam-
bling to the District, attacking the idea as a poor use of city re-
sources.
In a rare public stand on a controversial political issue, the
Greater Washington Board of Trade's 85-member board voted
unanimously against the initiative.
The group, which includes many of the Washington area's
most powerful business leaders, could have provided strong back-
ing for Kelly's plans to use gambling to spur economic develop-
ment. The mayor has courted the group on various financial is-
sues.
"The addition of casino gambling would not enhance the city's
image," the Board of Trade said in a statement . . . . "Directors
believe that the city should concentrate on key economic develop-
ment initiatives such as the convention center redevelopment,
neighborhood revitalization and an aggressive business retention
program," adding that gaming is "diverting the Kelly
administration's attention away from well-outlined priorities.""'
This decision by the Board of Trade was a significant reflection of busi-
ness acumen and it unanimously rejected the standard claims of economic
development promulgated by the legalized gambling interests. " 4
In any event, it should be emphasized that there are also fundamental
differences in substantial portions of the tourist and nontourist clienteles
attracted by complexes dedicated to gambling, as distinguished from other
112 Liz Spayd and Yolanda Woodlee, Trade Board Rejects D.C. Casino Plan, WASH. POST,
September 25, 1993, § A, at I [hereinafter Spayd].
I d. at 1 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 1, 8.
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types of tourist attractions. These differences are important, despite the
efforts of many legalized gambling facilities to disguise themselves as
"family entertainment centers." "But a casino is not an adult Disney-
land,""' 5 according to law professor I. Nelson Rose, who summarized
some of the issues differentiating a casino from a bona fide family enter-
tainment center.
Disneyland would not exploit minors, or drunks, or compulsives
[i.e., compulsive gamblers], even if it could get away with it. But
some casinos do it every day and then lie about it, even to them-
selves."6
Considerable weight should be given to the argument that in many re-
spects a Disney-style theme park and a legalized gambling complex are
not just different, but fundamentally incompatible. These problems lead to
the proposition that each state, particularly tourist-oriented states, must
decide on their "tourist environment" as well as their statewide "business
and community environments." Given some of Euro Disney's marketing
problems during the early 1990s,"' it would be difficult to believe that a
Manassas theme park would not have some serious concerns about proxi-
mate legalized gambling facilities -particularly riverboats and casinos.
The main point is that counties, cities, and states must choose their
respective business environments. Chicago needs to determine whether it
wants to be known as "the City that Works" or "the City that Gam-
bles.""' Likewise, Illinois needs to determine if it wants to be known as
"the State that Works" or "the State that Gambles." Virginia, Florida, and
other tourist-oriented states will also need to decide on their "tourist envi-
ronment.""' 9 As the Greater Washington Board of Trade emphasized,
"[tihe addition of casino gambling would not enhance the city's im-
"' I. Nelson Rose, The Rise And Fall Of The Third Wave: Gambling Will Be Outlawed In
Forty Years, at 65, 72, in GAMBLING AND PUBLIC POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPEcrIVES (William R.
Eadington and Judy A. Cornelius eds. 1991) (emphasis in original).
116 Id. at 72.
10 See, e.g., Euro Disney's Wish Comes True, THE ECONOMIST, March 19, 1994, at 83; Melt-
down At The Cultural Chernobyl, THE ECONOMIST, February 5, 1994, at 65.
Its Walsh, supra note 25, at 3 ("The dispute also has an emotional edge dealing with self-im-
age .... 'If we become the gambling center of the Midwest,' [Chicago Alderman Lawrence] Bloom
said, 'that's what we're going to be known as, and that's not what Chicago is."').
19 See Spayd, supra note 112, at 1.
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age,"'20 or as Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley concluded
"[clities trying to create a better image should stay away from gam-
bling."' 2 Before the twenty-first century, all U.S. counties, cities, and
states will be faced with similar issues involving their community and
business environments.
V. WHY BUSINESSES SHOULD NOT LOCATE IN LEGALIZED
GAMBLING STATES AND WHY THEY SHOULD CONSIDER
RELOCATING IF THEY CAN
A. The Business Environment in Gambling States as Inherently De-
structive
Sound economic reasons dictate that businesses should avoid locating
in counties and states with legalized gambling activities if they can locate
elsewhere.' Obviously, if the same degrees of legalized gambling pre-
exist in all potential locations, the gambling activities component and re-
lated considerations may be largely irrelevant. However, those areas with-
out legalized gambling activities have a competitive business-economic
advantage over those states which have legalized gambling.
The best policy for most states is to establish themselves as "gam-
bling-free" states. Gambling-free states escape the vast majority of socio-
economic problems which encumber the local economies and governments
of states with legalized gambling. States recently succumbing to pressures
to enact state lotteries (such as Georgia in November of 1992) would be
well-advised to disassociate their economies from legalized gambling ac-
tivities and return to their previous status as gambling-free states. The lon-
ger the legalized gambling philosophy is allowed to influence an economy,
the harder it becomes to revert to a gambling-free economy. However,
economic history also demonstrates that gambling activities are generally
recriminalized after an eventual erosion, and implosion, of the economy
originally embracing them.
123
A major reason that businesses do not want to be located in gambling
states is because legalized gambling elevates social-welfare pressures on
120 Id.
II Mich. Att'y Gen., supra note 98, at 4.
12 See, e.g., Buck et al., supra note 67, at 301-02; Hakim, supra note 67, at 414-15.
123 See Rose, supra note 115, at 74.
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local and state governments to raise corporate, personal, and real estate
taxes. Companies are naturally averse to paying higher corporate and real
estate taxes to address these increasing problems. Business employees dis-
like higher personal and real estate taxes for the same reasons. Nor do
businesses want to tack a salary bonus on their employees' paychecks to
cover the increased taxes concomitant to living in a "high-tax state." The
term "high-tax state" is a term which in the future will become more syn-
onymous with "gambling state."'"4 For example, in 1992 Money maga-
zine found Sioux Falls, South Dakota a prime community in which to
live.'" Interestingly, there were no personal income taxes in South Da-
kota. Naturally, potential employees want to live and work in such envi-
ronments. Since 1988, however, with the initiation and subsequent rapid
proliferation of legalized gambling activities in South Dakota, an eventual
state income tax is likely, and such activities may cause Sioux Falls to
lose its favorable community business environment. 26 By comparison, in
1988 Money magazine designated Atlantic City, New Jersey as the least
livable U.S. community.'27
Of course, it is possible for a smaller gambling economy to live para-
sitically off of a larger non-gambling economy - Nevada and California,
respectively - so long as the non-gambling economy cooperates. 2 It is
well-documented that there is "a direct transfer of income and wealth from
California to Nevada every year."'29 Gambling by Californians pumps
nearly $3.8 billion per year into Nevada,"3 which translates into over
one percent of California's Gross State Product."' In such an instance, it
is therefore possible for a gambling state, such as Nevada, to be a low-tax
124 An exception, however, is a small state, such as Nevada, living parasitically off of a larger
state, such as California. SUBSIDY, supra note 11, at ES-I; CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF
PLANNING AND RESEARCH, Office Of Planning And Research Releases Study Of The Economic Rela-
tionship Between California And Nevada As It Relates To Legalized Gambling, December 17, 1992, at
1-2 [hereinafter Cal. Research].
12 Marguerite T. Smith and Debra Wishik Englander, The Best Places To Live In America,
MONEY, September 1992. at 110.
126 See also John W. Kindt, Address before the South Dakota Citizens Forum on Video-Lottery
Terminals, Sioux Falls, S.D. (October 18, 1992).
IV Richard Eisenberg and Debra Wishik Englander, The Best Places To Live In America,
MONEY, August 1988. at 83.
in SUBSIDY. supra note 11, at ES-I, ES-4.
129 Id. at ES-I; Cal. Research, supra note 124, at 1.
1' SUBSIDY, supra note 11, at ES-I; Cal. Research, supra note 124, at 1.
131 SUBSIDY, supra note It, at ES-I.
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state with no business or personal income tax."' Yet the previous points
involving the economic advantages inherent in non-gambling states retain
their validity, because until recently, the Nevada/California scenario was
generally an exception. Furthermore, these principles can obviously be
reflected across state lines in a more regional phenomenon; that is, compa-
nies will be less likely to locate in general "regions" of the country where
the harder forms of gambling are legalized.
The business environment is poor for business operations in gambling
areas - except for legalized gambling organizations and their cluster ser-
vices. For years, Nevada has had several communities with sufficient in-
frastructure to support numerous light industries, and yet those industries
have chosen to locate elsewhere. There is no Silicon Valley or its equiva-
lent in Nevada, and one major reason is that a substantial majority of pre-
existing and potential employees do not want to work or raise families in
a Nevada-like gambling environment.
Although the major Nevada communities competed vigorously
throughout the 1980s to attract new businesses unrelated to legalized gam-
bling and its cluster services, these negative factors have created an image
which is not conducive to attracting new industries. Despite low taxes and
a cheap pool of labor, most major companies have decided against locat-
ing in Nevada. One major company which was persuaded to locate in the
Las Vegas area even changed its mailing address away from Las Vegas,
allegedly to protect its company's image.
In any event, the "community environment" and its concomitant "busi-
ness environment" appear to be the most important considerations re-
viewed by the Fortune 500 companies and other large businesses when
considering where to locate. As Nevada illustrates, these considerations
also appear to outweigh significantly the considerations pertaining to the
availability of infrastructure, the demographics of the labor pool, and even
tax rates.
132 Id.; CaL Research, supra note 124, at 1.
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B. Increased Personnel Costs for Businesses Located in Gambling
States
Businesses can also expect major personnel problems if they choose to
locate in a state with legalized gambling. Similarly, businesses will experi-
ence a premium in personnel costs if they allow the state in which they
are presently located to legalize gambling. In this context, it is helpful to
delineate strategic socio-economic factors which contribute to these in-
creased personnel costs for businesses.
In a state with no legalized gambling, the population will contain ap-
proximately .77 percent compulsive gamblers and 2.33 percent "potential"
compulsive gamblers.1 3 The associated socio-economic costs are usually
not readily apparent because they have already been subsumed into the
pre-existing economy measured over decades. Once gambling activities are
legalized and become socially "acceptable," however, the number of com-
pulsive gamblers quickly increases to between 1.5 to 5 percent of the
workforce." 4 To illustrate this point, if a business has 1,000 employees,
the number of compulsive gamblers would increase from approximately
eight to between fifteen and fifty employees. Furthermore, the "problem"
economic gamblers (which includes the compulsive gamblers above)
would total ten percent of the workforce, or 100 employees.'35 It is inter-
esting to note that this ten percent parallels, and indeed corroborates, the
reported clinical case load of problem gamblers in South Dakota, a state
which only recently introduced casino gambling and VLTs at the end of
1989. 136
As a direct result, then, businesses can anticipate increases of 100 to
13 See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD
GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 73 (1976) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON GAMBLING].
13 See Rachel A. Volberg, Estimating The Prevalence Of Pathological Gambling In The Unit-
ed States, in GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM GAMBLING (W. R. Eadington ed. 1992); Rachel A.
Volberg And Henry J. Steadman, Prevalence Estimates Of Pathological Gambling In New Jersey And
Maryland, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1618 (1989); Rachel A. Volberg And Henry J. Steadman, Refining
Prevalence Estimates Of Pathological Gambling. 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 502 (1988); ALBERTA LOT-
TERIES AND GAMING, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN ALBERTA 18 (January 1994) (summa-
rizing twenty studies showing prevalence rates of problem and pathological gambling among the adult
population of several states).
13 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 92-94.
06 S.D. Bankruptcies, supra note 29, at I ("ren percent of the clients who... went to the
Consumer Credit Counseling Services of Lutheran Social Services of Sioux Falls openly admit[ted]
that gambling underlies their financial problems .... ).
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550 percent in problems resulting from compulsive gamblers. Nationwide,
an entirely new addicted workforce is being created as a result of legaliz-
ing gambling. In addition to the family and financial problems associated
with compulsive gamblers which drain the resources of the local commu-
nity, the state, and society at large, problems also directly and indirectly
manifest themselves in the workforce. The internal problems which busi-
nesses can anticipate include increasing absenteeism and declining produc-
tivity. The average lost productivity for each compulsive gambler (at 1.5
to 5 percent of the workforce) has been calculated to be at least $15,000
per year,'37 but may be as high as $23,000 to $27,000.' To this total
should be added the lost productivity of problem economic gamblers
which, although not yet calculated within a range of specific dollar
amounts, involves an added 5 to 8.5 percent of the workforce. Further-
more, the vast majority of those identified as compulsive gamblers often
resort to theft from the workplace to finance their gambling.'39 Given
this information, one observer has commented that "from a purely finan-
cial point of view, compulsive gambling is potentially worse [for an em-
ployer] than alcoholism and drug abuse combined."'" In sum, personnel
problems involving the dismissal of employees will presumably increase,
and new legal grounds for dismissal may complicate the existing laws
involving management-personnel relations. 4 '
Furthermore, businesses are already facing increasing personnel prob-
lems, specifically rehabilitation costs, from employees engaging in illegal
drug use and alcohol abuse, both "addictions" according to the American
Psychiatric Association (APA). Several major companies have internalized
the costs of treating their addicted employees for substance abuse, specifi-
cally alcohol and drugs. Added to these costs will be the costs of treating
another APA-recognized addiction, gambling addiction.'42 Sociologists
137 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 14, at 59; see id. at 59-61.
138 ROBERT M. POLITZER ET AL., REPORT ON THE SOCIETAL COST OF PATHOLOGICAL GAM-
BLING AND THE COST-BENEFIT EFFECrTVENESS OF TREATMENT 9 (1981) [hereinafter POLITZER ET
AL.]; BETTER Gov'T ASs'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
1 Gerry T. Fulcher, The Dark Side Of A Trip To The Track, INDUS. WK., August 5, 1991,
at 13 ("85% of the thousands of identified compulsive gamblers admit to stealing from their employ-
ers, given the opportunity").
140 Id.
141 Perhaps the most interesting connection is that Type-A personalities - the very best blue-
collar workers, the most productive white-collar workers, and the aggressive entrepreneurial managers
- all fall within psychological profiles most susceptible to becoming problem gamblers. See MARY-
LAND REPORT, supra note 14, at 20-34.
142 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MEN-
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readily recognize the parallels between these three addictions. If conserva-
tive estimates of treating each gambling addict are utilized and absorbed
by companies, the rehabilitative costs per employee can easily range from
$15,000' to $42,000. 44
Therefore, in a hypothetical company with 1,000 employees, the num-
ber of gambling addicts will be .77 percent, or seven to eight employees,
before gambling is legalized. 145 This nominal sum often goes unnoticed
and/or unaddressed by employers. Once gambling becomes legalized,
however, a new addicted population will rise to include 1.5 to 5 percent of
the workforce, and fifteen to fifty addicted employees can be anticipated.
This 100 to 550 percent increase will transform a largely hidden problem
into a significant and costly personnel quandary. Responsible firms that
provide addiction treatment will face a conservative rehabilitative cost of
$20,000 per gambling-addicted employee." Increased personnel costs to
a company with 1,000 employees would then amount to between $140,000
and $840,000. Add to this a lost productivity cost of $15,000 to $27,000
per employee, 47 and business could incur $35,000 in costs per gambling
employee, for a total cost of $245,000 to $1.5 million.
It is unrealistic to think that state governments will directly shoulder
these costs. State governments, traditionally pressured by taxpayers, place
at least part of these rehabilitative and quality-of-life costs onto the busi-
nesses themselves. Businesses, then, will bear a substantial internal cost
burden generated by the problems associated with compulsive gambling.
Furthermore, a definite ten percent of our hypothetical workforce of 1,000
employees, or 100 people, will become problem economic gamblers, i.e.,
employees who are on their way to becoming compulsive gamblers, as
well as those already compulsive gamblers.
Counties, cities, and states with legalized gambling activities are and
will continue to become more competitively disadvantaged when trying to
TAL DISORDERS § 312.31 (rev. 3d ed. 1987).
143 Some estimates are as low as $5,000 to $10,000 for out-patients, but $20,000 is a more rea-
sonable number. BTER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
1" In-patient care for compulsive gamblers ranges from $17,000 to $20,000 per month at the
Compulsive Gambling Center, Inc., in Baltimore, Maryland, to between $15,000 and $42,000 per
month at other facilities, such as the Philadelphia Psychiatric Hospital. Interview with Dr. Valerie C.
Lorenz, Executive Director, Compulsive Gambling Center, Inc., Baltimore, Md. (November 10, 1992).
145 U.S. COMMISSION ON GAMBLING, supra note 133, at 73.
14 See notes 143 and 144, supra, and accompanying text.
147 See POLrrZER ET AL., supra note 138, at 9.
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attract new businesses. In 1990, for example, Champaign County, Illinois,
tried and failed to attract a $1-billion United Airlines facility. In 1992, the
same county tried to attract a Spiegel distribution center promising 2,000
jobs, but failed. Interestingly, Champaign City was in the midst of a well-
publicized legalized gambling controversy over off-track betting during
this time. Both companies ultimately located in states with much less le-
galized gambling. 48
These companies were probably utilizing business location models.
Given the inherent nature of such models, the Champaign community, by
embracing the gambling philosophy, was at a competitive disadvantage to
non-gambling communities. Throughout 1990-1991, there were well over
150 media reports on the gambling controversy in the newspapers, radio
reports, and television reports.49 It would be difficult to suggest that this
14 United Airlines settled in Indiana, and Spiegel located in Ohio. These companies undoubt-
edly utilized many factors in determining where to locate, and the Champaign gambling controversies
may have been minor. For public relations reasons, however, no company would give precise reasons
for choosing one community over another, and upper management might not have even realized the
full extent of the direct and indirect gambling "red-flags" which are inherent in most business location
models and which may have been reflected in their specialized models. Concessions promised by the
other sites might also have been the determining factors.
149 Public concerns involving alleged misinformation by the legalized gambling interests, as
sometimes abetted by the media, was exemplified by the following letter, which is reprinted in toto:
To the editor:
On June 30, [1990] the Ministers Alliance, representing eight black congregations,
came out against off-track betting facilities [OTBs] in the Champaign area.
The people of Champaign should ask themselves why most of the news organizations
chose not to report or to downplay this obviously newsworthy story.
While WICD television reported this event on June 30 (and while WCIA did not),
The News-Gazette has never mentioned this fact although The News-Gazette published sto-
ries on off-track betting on July 2, 4, 5, 6 (two articles) and July 7 (an article plus the
"Week in Quotes").
Obviously, several opportunities to report or mention this development in the black
community were ignored. Perhaps this should not be a surprise, since The News-Gazette's
lack of objectivity and blatant favoritism encouraging a betting parlor for Champaign was
apparent in most of these articles - but particularly in a full front-page article, with a color
photograph, in the June 24 edition of the paper.
The public would prefer objective news, instead of editorial opinion and Mayor
Dannel McCollum's propaganda disguised as news.
Letter to the Editor from Diane E. Pierce, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), July 27, 1990, § A, at 4.
The public opposition to the OTBs was apparently extensive and vigorous. See, e.g., Letter to the
Editor from J. E. Miller, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), July 13, 1990, § A, at 4 (indicating oppo-
sition to the OTBs from "at least 15 organizations"); Letter to the Editor from Connie Morenz, NEWS-
GAZEiFE (Champaign, I11.), July 23, 1990, § A, at 4 (indicating opposition to the OTBs "from over
two dozen civic and religious organizations" plus "eight ministers in the Ministers Alliance, represent-
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major community issue was not factored into the decision-making process
by both companies as they investigated the Champaign County region.
Regardless of these determinations, legalized gambling communities
and gambling states are in the process of developing poor community and
business environments. The extent of negative consequences these commu-
nities face, however, is not always apparent, since companies rarely report
their choices for location in a particular community based on its current or
predicted deteriorating community environment. This is necessarily prob-
lematic for legalized gambling states which generate such deteriorating
community environments. The economic trend is obvious; legalized gam-
bling states will continue to hurt their economies as they embrace the
gambling interests and the gambling philosophy. Savvy businesses should
not, and probably will not, locate in legalized gambling states. Moreover,
businesses should not expand their employee base in a gambling state, but
should attempt to relocate as many jobs as possible to non-gambling
ing the black community"); Letter to the Editor from Rev. Don Ehlers, NEwS-GAZErrE (Champaign,
Ill.), July 24, 1990, § A, at 4 (indicating "[a] sizeable number of individuals from the community,
especially from west Champaign, did oppose the location of an OTB in the city").
The OTB company's application first received general press exposure on May 30, 1990, but the
application to the Illinois Racing Board was scheduled for action on June 12, 1990. Potential oppo-
nents had only eight working days to voice their opposition and had to travel over 130 miles to the
hearing. See J. Philip Bloomer, Nursery School Location Could Keep Betting Parlor Out, NEWS-GA-
2ErrE (Champaign, ILL.), June 9, 1990, § A, at 1, 12 [hereinafter School Location]; Letter to the Editor
from Philip Miller, NEWS-GAZEmrE (Champaign, 111.), June 16, 1990, § A, at 4 (complaining about the
"fast-track" procedures). Under the Illinois Open Meetings Act, all meetings of public bodies are re-
quired to "be held at specific times and places which are convenient to the public." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 102, 42.01. As per this statute, or perhaps because of the public outcry, the Board's meeting was
postponed. See School Location, supra, at 1. See generally Kathleen Cardella, Paperwork, Short Notice
Help Stifle OTB Opposition, NEwS-GAzETTE (Champaign, Il.), October 10, 1991, § B, at 3 [hereinaf-
ter Cardella]. These "political actions have stifled public access to pertinent information regarding the
license application decisions that the public is entitled to know." Cardella, supra, at 3.
Along with these alarming changes, the Champaign and Danville off-track betting scenarios
have highlighted the swift speed with which the Illinois Racing Board can approve an off-
track betting license application. It requires no action on the part of local government and
possibly can be approved without public support.
Both the Champaign and Danville application processes underscore the short time
frame that the public has to learn about this complex political issue and voice its concerns.
It also demonstrates that public input is not always considered when approving off-track
betting parlors.
Unless there are changes in state law, other communities will be forced to act quickly
to prevent the establishment of off-track betting parlors in their community.
Cardella, supra, at 3.
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states.
VI. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE GAMBLING-FREE STATE
FOR RETAINING PRE-EXISTING BUSINESSES AND
ATTRACTING NEW BUSINESSES
Those states which do not have any form of legalized gambling, in-
cluding a state lottery, should not legalize gambling activities for purely
fiscal reasons alone. From a business/economic perspective, the best strate-
gy for a state is to declare itself a "gambling-free state" and then widely
advertise itself as such. States which have already legalized gambling
should re-criminalize gambling activities to boost their local economies.
One major reason is that since most states are becoming infatuated with
the gambling philosophy, those states without legalized gambling or with
minimal legalized gambling will have several relative socio-economic ad-
vantages contributing to a positive business/economic environment. Even
minimal legalized gambling in a state should be eliminated: once the
Pandora's box of legalized gambling is opened, the socio-economic prob-
lems rapidly become ingrained in the economic fabric of the state.
Within the near future, businesses will start looking for gambling-free
states or economies to which they can escape. Sooner or later, businesses
will become disenchanted with the socio-economic problems and relatively
high taxes of gambling states. Gambling-free states or states with less
gambling will have advantages in attracting new businesses and in retain-
ing pre-existing businesses. Strategically speaking, non-gambling states (or
minimal-gambling states) will have more vibrant local economies, propor-
tionately more consumer dollars, better sociological environments, more
productive jobs, and lower taxes. As of 1992, Utah and Hawaii were the
only remaining states without any legalized gambling activities whatsoever
- although many states still had very limited legalized gambling activi-
ties. Given Hawaii's reliance on a tourist economy, the citizenry of Hawaii
probably realized that any legalized gambling activities would severely
injure the pre-existing tourist economy. Furthermore, Utah was recogniz-
ing and promoting its gambling-free status as an economic plus, and Utah
Governor Mike Leavitt emphasized this advantage:
We're the number one job creation state in the country. We're
number two in personal income growth .... And there are a lot
of people, frankly, that would like to move to a state where there
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is no gaming, where in fact you can have a safe place, a clean
place to live.... "'
As other states expand legalized gambling activities, the gambling-free
states and those states which minimize gambling activities will increase
their competitive advantage in attracting and retaining nongambling-related
businesses.
Similarly, many businesspersons instinctively recognize many of these
economic principles. When a land-based casino was projected in New Or-
leans, local entrepreneurs, including the New Orleans Business Council,
actively opposed the casino and the guaranteed effect of legalized gam-
bling facilities on pre-existing consumer dollars and tourist dollars. They
feared that a casino would take customers from the native merchants and
restauranteurs. Moreover, they failed to see how the Crescent City could
benefit by dividing the substantial, existing tourist trade amongst itself.
Not surprisingly, many New Orleanians were outraged that a proposed
referendum on the casino issue was disallowed.'5'
In future years, businesses will invariably be attracted to non-gambling
states, or to those states with less gambling, and their healthier economies
with more consumer dollars, better business environments, and lower
socio-economic problems. On a relative basis, the consumer dollars in
non-gambling states will be less likely to be syphoned into the legalized
gambling organizations, which are highly competitive in capturing local
"consumer dollars" and transforming them into "gambling dollars."'5
Excepting the instances where a small gambling state lives parasitically off
of the economy of a non-gambling state,' the corporate, personal, and
real estate taxes should be proportionately lower for gambling-free states
and states with minimal gambling. In sum, the less there is of legalized
gambling, the more vibrant the economy will be.
In the long-term, gambling-free states will also have proportionately
more economic strength than gambling states. For example, Georgia
should immediately revoke its state lottery, because as one of the last non-
IO This Week with David Brinkley, (ABC television broadcast, March 20, 1994) (statement of
Utah Governor Mike Leavitt).
"' Koselka, supra note 45, at 63.
I32 See generally GOODMAN, supra note 3. See also William R. Eadington, Economic Percep-
tions Of Gambling Behavior, 3 J. GAMBLING BEHAV. 264 (1987).
15 See notes 128-132, supra, and accompanying text.
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gambling states, its economy would prosper in comparison with its sister
states. The local economies of gambling-free states will always have ad-
vantages in warding off recessionary economic trends. By comparison,
these economic advantages will be unavailable to the gambling states, and
since gambling economies have inherent recessionary trends, future reces-
sions could be proportionately more severe in gambling states.
The legalized gambling interests frequently urge states to enact state
lotteries or other forms of legalized gambling, claiming that gambling dol-
lars are being lost to other states or communities. However, this argument
that "everybody is doing it" is patently deceptive and inherently invalid as
an argument for anything. Similarly invalid is the argument by legalized
gambling proponents that gambling should be legalized because "it's
fun."' 4 An associated argument of legalized gambling proponents is that
while there may be some more crime and some socio-economic negatives,
gambling is going to be legalized so people simply ought to accept it and
enjoy it. In other words, the state is going to get assaulted economically,
so the state might as well accept it. Obviously, there are regional draws
that cross state lines, but what the legalized gambling proponents ultimate-
ly fail to mention is that while gambling dollars may be "lost" to other
states, so are many of the socio-economic negatives.'
When policymakers can avoid myopic fixation on the initial economic
flash which the influx of dollars would create in any localized scenario, it
readily becomes apparent that legalized gambling activities almost invari-
ably raise taxes, cost jobs, and create large socio-economic problems.
Across the spectrum of pre-existing nongambling businesses, there must
necessarily be a growing awareness of the difficulties of competing for
those consumer dollars being transformed into gambling dollars 56 when
legalized gambling activities enter a state and its communities. In the
15 See. e.g., Illinois Journal (WCIA-Channel 3 [Champaign-Springfield, Ill.] television broad-
cast, June 6 and 7, 1992) (interview with John Giovenco, President of the Gaming Division for Hilton
Hotels Corp.). This argument is seductive because it suggests that public opinion is on the side of le-
galized gambling, when in fact it is rarely so when valid economic arguments are presented in a timely
manner.
"' The rare exception to this scenario is exemplified by Las Vegas whose large tourist base
means that the socio-economic problems associated with compulsive gambling are largely "exported"
when the tourists return to their home states. The general rule is that states which legalize gambling
and make it convenient to gamble are creating and retaining socio-economic negatives. These factors
are widely recognized as the "acceptability factor" and the "accessibility factor."
136 See note 152, supra, and accompanying text.
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long-term, gambling-free states should experience proportionately less per-
sonal and business bankruptcies, stronger financial institutions, more vi-
brant business economies, and better tourist, business, and community en-
vironments. All of these fundamentals translate into solid advantages for
gambling-free states to attract and retain businesses unassociated with le-
galized gambling activities. In all, one thing remains certain: before the
end of this century, all states and many countries will be faced with estab-
lishing and maintaining the parameters of their strategic business and eco-
nomic environments.
